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diffusion are considered and a range of mechanisms to improve 
technology transfer are proposed.
FacTors resTrIcTIng Technology TransFer
Despite clear recognition of the benefits technology diffu-
sion offers to mitigate climate change, not enough has been done 
to advance that role. There are various factors acting as barriers 
to efficient and useful technology transfer from advanced and 
developed countries to recipient developing countries.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) 
has listed high capital costs, limited access to capital, poor access 
to information, institutional and administrative difficulties in 
developing technology transfer contracts, lack of infrastruc-
ture to absorb riskier technologies, absence of economic incen-
tives, and intellectual property rights as hurdles for technology 
InTroDucTIon
It is generally agreed upon that an efficient diffusion and deployment of technology has the potential to mitigate the adverse impacts of greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions and 
to reduce emissions.1 If developing countries were able to use 
available technologies to reduce their energy consumption by 
twenty percent, the currently projected increase between 2000 
and 2020 in carbon dioxide (“CO2”) emissions from develop-
ing countries could be cut by almost half.2 Although the role of 
technology transfer in reducing emissions is widely recognized, 
effective wide-scale transfer has been hindered by a number of 
factors, including international property rights regimes. 
Transfer of technology in the international context com-
monly refers to sale or licensing of intellectual property, but 
the term includes any process by which users in one country 
gain access to and utilize technology developed in another 
country.3 The term technology implies any practical applica-
tion of knowledge in a particular area,4 but it is usually associ-
ated with machines and related infrastructure, and technology 
is often discussed in this constricted sense. This narrow view 
combined with developing countries’ large-scale import of 
knowledge based machinery, products, and process licenses 
creates the perception of developing countries as “technol-
ogy users” and “passive recipients” of developed country 
technologies.5
In a globalized world, technology may be transferred 
from developed countries to developing or between develop-
ing countries, based on cost or other considerations, even if 
similar technology is locally available. Hence, using a foreign 
source of technology does not necessarily mean a “transfer of 
technology” has occurred. An analysis of the sixty-three Clean 
Development Mechanism (“CDM”)6 projects that were regis-
tered on January 1, 2006 offers a picture of the current state of 
technology transfer.7 Of the twenty-nine overall CDM projects 
that involved foreign technology, the largest number (twelve) 
were in hydropower, and the technology for them came from all 
over the world, including several developing countries like Bra-
zil, China, India, Panama, Peru, and Sri Lanka.8 Technology for 
hydropower is fairly standardized and the use of a foreign source 
of technology in many CDM projects may not mean that transfer 
of high value technology was involved. 
This paper provides an overview of barriers to technol-
ogy transfer and specifically examines problems posed by both 
strong and weak international property rights (“IPR”) regimes. 
Whether and how IPR regimes act as limiting factor in effective 
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Biogas 6 387,591 1.4
Biomass 10 302,735 1.1
Energy 
efficiency 1 6,580 0.0
Fuel switch 1 19,438 0.1
HFC-23 
destruction 3 8,233,566 28.9
Hydropower 22 775,471 2.7
Landfill gas 10 2,712,395 9.5
Methane capture 3 410,378 1.4
N2O destruction 2 15,111,165 53.0
Wind energy 5 573,013 2.0
Total 63 28,532,332 100
Figure 1. Emission Reductions by Technology in the 63 Registered 
CDM Projects.9
43 susTaInable DevelopmenT law & polIcy
transfer.10 Causes may vary not only from country to country, 
but technology to technology as well. 
Both developed and developing countries accept that transfer 
of technology has been slow and ineffective, but they attribute it 
to different causes. The Institute for Global Environmental Strat-
egies (“IGES”), in Asian Aspirations for Climate Change beyond 
2021, has highlighted the contrasting perspectives of developed 
and developing countries with regard to technology transfer.11 
The developed countries hold lack of robust legal mechanisms 
and domestic institutions in developing countries responsible.12 
Since most of the CDM technologies are developed and owned 
by a few private companies, developed countries cite the need 
for friendly domestic policies, institutions, and strong intellec-
tual property rights protection in developing countries to encour-
age technology diffusion.13 
On the contrary, from the perspective of developing coun-
tries, the failure of developed countries to meet their obliga-
tions under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(“UNFCCC”), and their lack of awareness and willingness to 
do so, are cited as primary reasons for inadequate technology 
transfer.14 Other reasons often cited are the lack of programs and 
initiatives at the government level, as well as high capital and 
licensing costs.15
InTellecTual properTy rIghTs (“Ipr”)
Intellectual property is a category of intangible rights pro-
tecting commercially valuable products of human intellect.16 It 
refers to creations of the mind: inventions, literary and artistic 
works, as well as symbols, names, images, and designs used in 
commerce.17 The impact of IPR on technology diffusion is con-
text specific and complex. IPR in the hands of a few has the 
ability to create a monopolistic situation where dissemination of 
knowledge is restricted on account of limited access and higher 
prices for climate friendly technologies. Strongly protected IPR 
held by supplier firms may also prevent users or recipients from 
obtaining access to technologies in order to adapt them to suit 
their own needs and requirements. However, an assurance of 
one’s IPR being protected may encourage the owner to transfer 
his technology to another country. Therefore, a lack of adequate 
protection for IPR in the recipient country can also inhibit trans-
fer of technology.
lack of ipr protection
In its Special Report on Climate Change, the IPCC observes 
that a “major requirement for successful agreement in technol-
ogy transfer is the guarantee of intellectual property rights.”18 
An effective and enforceable IPR law provides an incentive for 
private companies to disseminate or transfer their technology. 
A strong IPR protection may also facilitate transfer of technol-
ogy through increased trade in goods and services, foreign direct 
investment (“FDI”) by private companies, technology licensing, 
and joint ventures.19 IPR protection may result in larger trade 
flows, “albeit mainly for countries with imitative capability” 
involving “substitution of domestic innovation for technology 
produced abroad.”20 
It is generally believed that most developing countries do not 
fully enforce their IPR protection laws.21 Hence, one may hasten 
to conclude that the lack of adequate IPR protection might have 
been a factor inhibiting transfer of technologies. Though much is 
unknown about the actual extent of weakness in the IPR protec-
tion regimes in developing countries by way of comprehensive 
survey, the annual “Special 301” reports, prepared by the Office 
of the U.S. Trade Representative on the adequacy and effective-
ness of IPR protection by U.S. trading partners, can shed some 
light.22 Along with many developing countries, the EU has been 
on the list of countries that infringes on IPR and only recently 
moved off of the list in 2007.23 
It is difficult to infringe on the IPR of a sophisticated 
technology that requires extensive scientific and technical 
knowledge. In some cases, the basic scientific knowledge of 
patented technologies is accessible—what is not available 
is the right to use such knowledge. If developing country 
companies are not using such technologies, they are either 
respecting the patent rights or they are not technologically 
capable of using them.
ipr-baSeD market power
A technology protected by a strong IPR regime is less likely 
to reach a vast number of users in developing countries as there 
may be high licensing costs.24 In some cases, the owner may 
refuse to grant a license altogether, halting the spread of the 
technology. DuPont, for example, refused to grant licenses for 
the production of chlorofluorocarbon substitutes to Korean and 
Indian firms that sought to use the substitutes to meet the phase 
out requirements for ozone depleting substances.25 When a par-
ticular technology is not licensed to other users and the owner 
sells it in the form of products and equipment, a monopoly is 
created. Monopoly production is often inefficient and pushes 
prices even higher.26
In the context of most technologies, especially climate 
change mitigation, gaining access or ownership of the IPR 
is not the sole and sufficient requirement for a successful 
diffusion and deployment of technology. The licensing of a 
technology may have to be accompanied by large investments 
in developing the skills and know-how to incorporate, adapt, 
and develop further the technology obtained. Some experts 
opine that IPR regimes should address factors such as absorp-
tive capacity and tacit knowledge in addition to technology 
access issues.27 The importance of this assertion can be high-
lighted through two examples in India, light-emitting diode 
(“LED”) manufacture and Integrated Gasification Combined 
Cycle (“IGCC”) power plant technology. Without technologi-
cal capacity, IPR ownership would not have improved India’s 
ability to manufacture LEDs.28 Similarly, the main barrier to 
the use of IGCC technology is lack of knowledge about its 
performance with low quality Indian coal, rather than IPR 
ownership.29 
The present IPR regime has a limited scope for improving 
transfer of technology to developing countries in this respect. 
Lynn Mytelka, former director of the United Nations University 
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Institute for New Technologies, suggests that the possibility 
for the transfer of technical assistance and capacity building to 
developing countries in areas capable of meeting local devel-
opment needs and global environmental concerns should be 
enhanced through the patent system itself.30
The stage of commercialization of a technology determines 
the extent to which the developer needs and expects returns.31 
The level of a country’s development is also a determining factor 
for the IPR impact on technology 
transfer. In cases of developed 
and technologically advanced 
countries, strengthening IPR can 
increase innovation and technol-
ogy diffusion. In middle-income 
countries, a stronger IPR regime 
may encourage both domestic 
innovation and technology dif-
fusion through foreign patenting 
and international trade, both of 
which can encourage growth. But 
the beneficial impact of stronger 
IPR protection on domestic inno-
vation and technology diffusion 
can offset the growth-enhancing 
benefits otherwise obtained from 
imitation.32 
Apart from IPR, a range of 
other factors, including the level 
of development, nature of tech-
nology, and technical know-how 
to adapt and develop technolo-
gies, affect transfer of technology. These factors also determine 
the manner in which IPR impacts technology transfer for fight-
ing climate change in developing countries.
aDDressIng Ipr as a challenge
It is difficult to determine the precise impact that IPR has 
on technology transfer, either by way of reduced access or 
increased prices. To do so would require a detailed product-by-
product and country-by-country analysis. There have been many 
suggestions in the recent past to address IPR as a challenge to 
efficient transfer of climate change fighting technologies. Sug-
gestions range from compulsory licensing, to joint ownership, to 
technology acquisition, and knowledge repository funds. Some 
of these are discussed below as possible mechanisms to mitigate 
the negative impact of IPR.
compulSory licenSing
A compulsory license is a statutorily created license that 
allows certain people to pay a royalty and use an invention with-
out the patentee’s permission.33 Ordinarily, compulsory licens-
ing refers to the government authorizing itself to use otherwise 
protected intellectual property without having to obtain the per-
mission or authorization of a patent holder in cases of national 
emergency or for public good.34
An old IPR concept, the term compulsory licensing is not 
explicitly incorporated into the Trade Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) regime of the World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”). However, compulsory licensing can be 
read into the provision of TRIPS Agreement on “Other Use [of 
the patented subject matter] Without Authorization of the Right 
Holder.”35 Articles on “Exceptions to Rights of Conferred”36 and 
“Principles,” including reference to measures “needed to prevent 
the abuse of intellectual prop-
erty rights by right holders” and 
“the resort to practices which 
unreasonably restrain trade or 
adversely affect the interna-
tional transfer of technology”37 
also provide reasonable flexibil-
ity for countries to use compul-
sory licensing. Drawing from 
TRIPS and the Doha Develop-
ment Declaration, a compulsory 
license can be granted to meet 
government requirements, over-
come an abuse of patent rights, 
in a national emergency, for 
public non-commercial use, and 
for a technical advance of con-
siderable economic significance 
over the existing patent.38 
Article 31(c) of TRIPS also 
provides that a country can use 
such a measure “to remedy a 
practice determined after judi-
cial or administrative process to be anti-competitive.”39 Hence, 
countries can invoke their competition law where “abuse of 
dominance” is included as one of the anti-competitive practices 
and the source of dominance is an IPR.40
Similarly, Article 40 of TRIPS, dealing with control of anti-
competitive practices in contractual licenses, states that “[n]oth-
ing in this Agreement shall prevent Members from specifying 
in their legislation licensing practices or conditions that may 
in particular cases constitute an abuse of intellectual property 
rights having an adverse effect on competition in the relevant 
market.”41 Hence, refusal to give license can also be included as 
an anti-competitive practice and may be remedied with compul-
sory licensing.
compulSory licenSing in public health
Rights of the TRIPS member countries to make use of 
compulsory licensing in the interest of public health have been 
explicitly recognized in the Doha Declaration on Public Health. 
In order to make use of compulsory licensing in the CDM con-
text, climate change mitigation must be treated as a public good. 
Here, we briefly examine the issues of compulsory licensing in 
public health and then we will look at clean technology.
The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health clarified the rights of member countries with regard to 
IPR in the hands  
of a few has the 
ability to create a 
monopolistic situation 
where dissemination of 
knowledge is restricted 
on account of limited 
access and higher prices 
for climate friendly 
technologies. 
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the compulsory licensing system by recognizing that each mem-
ber has the right to grant compulsory licenses and the freedom to 
determine the grounds upon which such licenses are granted.42 
Subsequently, Thailand issued a compulsory license in late 
2006 for five years on Efavirenz, a patented AIDS drug from 
Merck.43 More recently, Brazil issued a compulsory license in 
May of 2007 for the same product.44 However, countries still 
face difficulties with compulsory licensing for pharmaceuticals. 
For example, Brazil came under tremendous pressure from the 
United States—which filed and later withdrew a complaint to 
the WTO—to repeal a law that allowed the government to issue 
a compulsory license when patent holders do not manufacture 
the drug in Brazil. Although Brazil successfully defeated the 
challenge by the United States, 
many smaller countries are not 
able to do so.45
Although some steps have 
been taken in this direction, 
the declaration and the subse-
quent TRIPS amendment have 
left many issues untouched and 
lack guidelines for eligibility 
for compulsory licensing. 
compulSory licenSing in 
clean technologieS
At the UN Climate Change 
Conference in Poznanń in 
December 2008, developing 
countries advocated a paradigm 
shift in the way climate mitiga-
tion technologies are subject 
to intellectual property rights 
protection. Many suggested 
a strategy similar to afford-
able medicines.46 For example, 
India proposed an approach 
analogous to pharmaceuticals: creating a mechanism that would 
ensure that privately owned technologies are available on an 
affordable basis, including through measures to resolve the bar-
riers posed by intellectual property rights and addressing com-
pulsory licensing of patented technologies.47
TRIPS has recognized countries’ freedom to determine for 
themselves what constitutes national emergency for the pur-
poses of compulsory licensing. Although countries have some 
flexibility to determine when and in which cases to make use of 
compulsory licensing, confusion and conflict will likely result 
without guidelines or directives. As mentioned above, to make 
use of the provisions of compulsory licensing, first and foremost 
climate change mitigation has to be treated as a public good. 
Detailed guidelines and specifications to help a country identify 
a technology that can be eligible for issuing of a compulsory 
license are needed. Similarly, an eligibility criterion for coun-
tries should be created because many developing countries lack 
domestic capabilities for production and may not be able to use 
a technology unless there is an amendment in TRIPS in line with 
the one made for pharmaceutical products.48 
Even if compulsory licensing is adopted for climate change 
technologies, it may not alone solve the problem as incremental 
costs for adapting and putting the technology to use in local con-
text may also be high. 
It is not an easy task to accommodate the interests of the 
developer of the technology (and indirectly incentives for fur-
ther research and development) on the one hand and the need to 
address rapid climate change on the other. This balance has to be 
met in a manner that is diplomatic and as minimally politically 
contentious as possible. There have been only few instances 
of compulsory license issuing, and instances of compulsory 
licensing by a national authority 
where the IPR-owner is a foreign 
national or domiciliary are even 
less common.49 It is a very politi-
cal issue.50
other flexibilitieS in the 
exiSting regimeS
In addition to compulsory 
licensing, other measures beyond 
the TRIPS regime, such as coop-
erative research and development 
and technology acquisition funds, 
could be used to reduce the high 
costs resulting from strong IPR 
protection. Creation of a technol-
ogy acquisition fund has been 
proposed within the framework 
of the UNFCCC.51 Such a fund 
could be managed by a multi-
lateral organization or a trust, 
which serves to acquire or buy 
out patented technologies that 
are climate friendly and make 
them available to developing countries in need of technology to 
reduce or mitigate GHG emissions.
Most of the clean technologies are owned by a handful of 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(“OECD”) countries. The largest environmental corporations in 
the world are from Germany, France, Japan, the United King-
dom, and the United States, who export equipment, technology, 
and services worldwide.52 These large corporations typically 
provide integrated products and services and account for about 
fifty percent of the global market.53 If one considers the mar-
ket for technology only, their share is likely even higher. Within 
specific segments of the environmental industry, a few large 
corporations virtually dominate.54 Three countries—Germany, 
Japan, and the United States—submit about sixty-four percent 
of the patent applications related to environmental technology 
in the European Patent Office.55 A patent buy-out mechanism 
is an option that could avoid the need for compulsory licens-
ing, thereby accounting for the patent owners’ concerns as well. 
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Endnotes:  Clean Technology Transfer and Intellectual 
Property Rights
It is likely the “most diplomatic alternative” to compulsory 
license.56 
Kevin Outterson, a law professor at Boston University who 
focuses on achieving equitable access to pharmaceuticals while 
still encouraging innovation, has outlined a detailed process for a 
suitable buy-out mechanism.57 He suggests that it may be owned 
or purchased by an intergovernmental organization or a philan-
thropic foundation and should not be limited to any one technol-
ogy or region. To make the provision attractive to developers of 
technology as well, the compensation to be paid in an acquisition 
could be determined by the net present value of expected future 
profits.58 Such a proposal has also been advocated by Mytelka, 
suggesting a knowledge fund as the repository of patents dealing 
with environmentally sound technologies.59
In setting up a technology acquisition or repository fund, 
many details will have to be considered. These may include 
how to gain the knowledge required to work the acquired pat-
ents locally, whether the patents will be in public domain or the 
purchaser would have exclusive rights, what the grounds and 
conditions for transfer will be, what modes of acquisition will 
be used, and how much will be adequate compensation to the 
patent holder.
Another possible mechanism is mandatory price negotia-
tion. This is very common in many countries, both developed 
and developing, in pharmaceutical products.60 Price regulation 
can be imposed even as a competition-remedy measure. Since 
countries are empowered to act under their competition regimes, 
such a mechanism is legally possible. However, for many 
developing countries, it would not be easy to enforce when the 
companies in question are large transnational companies from 
powerful countries. There are very few cases of a country tak-
ing action on a foreign company under competition law, even in 
the developed world. In the developing world such an action is 
almost non-existent.61 
conclusIon
Transfer and diffusion of technology from developed to 
developing countries is happening at a very slow pace. Trans-
fer is even slower in climate-related technologies. The intellec-
tual property rights regime can be an important factor. In the 
developed world, compulsory licensing has often been used to 
make technology readily available. Mandatory price negotia-
tions, as well as price regulations, are also used in some measure 
especially in pharmaceutical products. However, what is legally 
possible is not always practically feasible. The fact that the 
companies holding such technologies are powerful companies 
from powerful countries makes technology transfer difficult for 
politically weaker developing countries. Thus, the economic and 
political factors make it difficult to invoke the basic legal instru-
ments to access these technologies. 
Given this, it appears that a global technology acquisition 
fund is the most promising means to spread these technologies. 
This is, of course, not in lieu of other available instruments, but 
in addition to them. It would be difficult to create such a mecha-
nism given the present global geo-political context. It is often 
said that developed country governments cannot control tech-
nology transfer, as it is private companies, not governments, that 
actually own the technologies. However, the governments may 
be able to pay their companies adequate compensation in order 
to make the technologies available to developing countries. But 
merely making the technologies available may not be enough. 
The use of technologies may be expensive and difficult in devel-
oping countries without the necessary capacity. Generous finan-
cial assistance would also be required, even for deployment of 
technologies that are available at concessional rates. 
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